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PRODUCT RECALLS: WHY IS TORT LAW 
DEFERRING TO AGENCY INACTION? 
JILL WIEBER LENS† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, General Motors recalled some models of its cars due 
to a defective ignition switch.1  Product recalls are common and 
usually not too noteworthy.  But this recall became noteworthy 
when it was revealed that GM knew of the potential problem 
with the ignition switch as early as 2001.2  Yet, it waited thirteen 
years to actually recall the cars.3 
The thirteen-year delay was likely unreasonable.  The 
ignition switch posed a risk of death both to drivers of the 
defective cars and to other motorists.  In fact, GM has agreed to 
pay compensation for 124 deaths, 18 catastrophic injuries, and 
257 other injuries related to the ignition switch.4  Given this 
 
† Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. J.D., University of Iowa 
College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The author thanks the organizers and 
participants at the 2015 Texas Legal Scholars Conference, especially Joe Sanders, 
and the organizers and participants at the 2014 Oklahoma Junior Scholars 
Conference for their feedback. The author also thanks Jess Dees (Baylor J.D. 2015), 
Jake Jones (Baylor J.D. 2016), and Mitch Garrett (Baylor J.D. 2016) for their 
valuable research assistance. Any mistakes are, of course, the author’s. 
1 Danielle Ivory, ‘Bellwether’ G.M. Trial Opens over Defect Claim, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/business/trial-begins-in-gm-
ignition-defect-case.html (“In February 2014, G.M. began recalling what eventually 
numbered 2.6 million Chevrolet Cobalts, Ions and other small cars for a defect in the 
ignition switch.”). 
2 Danielle Ivory, G.M. Reveals It Was Told of Ignition Defect in ’01, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/business/gm-reveals-it-was-
told-of-ignition-defect-in-01.html. 
3 Tanya Basu, Timeline: A History of GM’s Ignition Switch Defect, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 31, 2014, 4:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/31/297158876/timeline-
a-history-of-gms-ignition-switch-defect. 
4 Bill Vlasic, G.M. Compensated Some Pre-Bankruptcy Crash Victims, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/business/gm-compensa 
ted-some-pre-bankruptcy-crash-victims.html. After the recall, GM hired Kenneth 
Feinberg to create and run a compensation fund for those injured or killed due to the 
defective ignition switch. Michael A. Fletcher & Rebecca Robbins, GM Offers 
Millions To Compensate Some Ignition Switch Victims, Families, WASH. POST (June 
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grave risk, if the costs of a product recall were manageable, a 
reasonable manufacturer likely would have recalled the product. 
But GM will not face tort liability related to its thirteen-year 
delay in recalling the vehicles.5  Why not?  Because the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration never ordered nor 
encouraged GM to recall its affected vehicles within that 
thirteen-year period.  Essentially, tort liability cannot exist 
because no agency ordered a product recall. 
This effectively complete deference to agency determinations 
contrasts starkly with courts’ treatment of other agency actions.  
For example, courts give little deference to agency safety 
standards.  A manufacturer can easily be liable for compensatory 
and punitive damages despite complying with an agency’s safety 
standards, like a required product warning.  Similarly, the post-





5 Many individuals allegedly injured by the defective ignition switches chose not 
to seek relief and instead have filed traditional defect products liability claims 
against GM. A multi-district litigation against GM is pending in the Southern 
District of New York as of the date of publication of this Article. The court was set to 
conduct six bellwether trials in 2016. Ivory, supra note 1. Within these six 
bellwether trials, the court addressed a post-sale duty to recall three times. 
Remarkably, the court allowed the first plaintiff to pursue a “negligent recall” claim 
under Oklahoma law, concluding it was no different than a general negligence claim. 
See In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig. (In re Gen. Motors I), No. 14-MD-
2543 (JMF), 2015 WL 9582714, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2015). The vast majority of 
states and the Third Restatement of Torts reject such a claim. See infra Section II.A. 
The court also allowed the claim to proceed because GM had instituted a voluntary 
recall. See In re Gen. Motors I, 2015 WL 9582714, at *9 (“In any event, New GM also 
assumed a duty when it instituted the recall.”). That claim is consistent with the 
overwhelming majority view. See infra Section II.A. But the claim based on the 
voluntary recall is limited to injuries incurred due to unreasonableness within the 
recall GM undertook and does not cover injuries incurred due to GM’s unreasonable 
failure to recall the product earlier. The court dismissed claims related to post-sale 
conduct in the second bellwether trial, which was based on Louisiana law. See In re 
Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig. (In re Gen. Motors II), No. 14-MD-2543 
(JMF), 2016 WL 874778, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016). The court later found no 
post-sale duty to recall under Virginia law. In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch 
Litig. (In re Gen. Motors III), No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2016 WL 4367959, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016). Of the 2016 bellwether trials pending in the Southern 
District of New York, “one . . . was dropped before trial, GM won two, and three have 
been settled.” Associated Press, General Motors Settles 2 Bellwether Ignition Switch 
Cases, NBC News (Sept. 5, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/con 
sumer/general-motors-settles-2-bellwether-ignition-switch-cases-n643046. 
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no attention to whether the agency ordered a manufacturer to 
issue a post-sale warning.  Again, a manufacturer can easily be 
liable for compensatory and punitive damages even though no 
agency ever required it to issue a post-sale warning. 
Courts see product recalls differently, however.  Courts 
believe they are ill equipped to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
product recall and thus defer to agencies.  Tort law defers to 
agency determinations of whether the benefits of the recall 
justify the costs; in other words, whether a reasonable 
manufacturer would have recalled the product.  If an agency 
determines that a recall would be reasonable and orders one, 
then a manufacturer can be liable in tort if it acts unreasonably 
within that recall.  But if not, then tort liability cannot exist; 
after all, a reasonable manufacturer would not have recalled the 
product. 
Thus, agency action is a prerequisite for tort liability.  If a 
government agency never orders nor otherwise encourages a 
manufacturer to recall a product, the manufacturer is unlikely to 
ever face tort liability related to a recall.  A glaring problem 
exists with this complete deference.  An agency’s not ordering a 
recall is not the same thing as deciding that no recall was 
appropriate; instead, it is inaction.  Deference to agency inaction 
is nonsensical.  It is also inconsistent with negligence per se 
principles.  There is nothing special about product recalls to 
merit this unique legal treatment.  Yet, courts allow agency 
inaction to preclude the possibility of tort liability for what seems 
likely unreasonable conduct. 
Part I of this Article explores tort law’s treatment of agency 
standards and regulations regarding determinations of product 
defectiveness, the propriety of post-sale warnings, and whether 
to punish the manufacturer with punitive damages.  Part II then 
explains how tort law treats agency determinations—and lack 
thereof—on product recalls.  This Part explains how tort law’s 
narrow standards for liability defer to agency orders to determine 
the reasonableness of a product recall and how that deference is 
illogical and inconsistent with negligence per se principles.  Part 
II also concludes that product recalls are not so special so as to 
deserve special treatment within tort law. 
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I. A DEFAULT OF NO DEFERENCE 
“Products liability is a mixture of state tort law and federal 
regulation.”6  State tort law could easily look to those federal 
regulations to help resolve many issues within the products 
liability claim.  And state courts do—violation of a regulation can 
show defect or unreasonable conduct as a matter of law.  But 
courts refuse to treat compliance the same.  Compliance with 
regulations does not preclude the possibility of a defect nor does 
it preclude the possibility of a finding of unreasonable conduct 
based on a failure to issue a post-sale warning.  Courts also 
refuse to defer to agency regulations to determine the 
appropriateness of punishment. 
A. No Deference in Determinations of Defectiveness 
A products liability cause of action enables the plaintiff to 
recover compensatory damages for injuries caused by a product 
defect.  Among other elements, the plaintiff has to demonstrate 
that the product is defective.  Courts have developed tests for 
three different types of product defects.7  A manufacturing defect 
exists if the manufacturer fails to make the product as it 
intended, regardless of the reason for the departure from that 
intent.8  A design defect exists if “the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been . . . avoided by the adoption 
of a reasonable alternative design.”9  Last, a warning defect 
exists if the manufacturer fails to warn of foreseeable dangers 
about which it either knew or should have known at the time of 
sale.10 
 
6 Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 
55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1217 (1996). 
7 All of these traditional definitions of defect focus on the time of the product’s 
sale to determine defectiveness. 
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
9 Id. § 2(b). This Third Restatement definition of design defect is controversial 
because of its dependence on an alternative design. Some states that evaluate design 
defectiveness under a risk-utility test do not require an alternative design. See, e.g., 
Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182–83 (N.H. 2001). 
Also, some states use the consumer expectations test for design defectiveness, which 
dictates that a product is defective if it is more dangerous than the ordinary 
consumer would expect. See, e.g., Horst v. Deere & Co., 769 N.W.2d 536, 554 (Wis. 
2009). 
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (providing that a 
warning defect exists if “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
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In addition to applying these tests to determine if a product 
is defective, a court could easily look to an outside source—an 
administrative agency.  Congress long ago created administrative 
agencies to help improve product safety.  For example, Congress 
wanted to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries 
resulting from traffic accidents.”11  To do so, it created the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and 
mandated that it “prescribe motor vehicle safety standards.”12  
Similarly, Congress wanted to “protect the public against 
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer 
products.”13  Congress thus created the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (“CPSC”) and empowered it to “promulgate 
consumer product safety standards.”14  The same is true for the 
Food and Drug Administration, which exists to “promote the 
public health.”15  The FDA has the statutory power to implement 
regulations for products under its jurisdiction, including 
prescription drugs, nonprescription drugs, cosmetics, some foods, 
medical devices, and tobacco products.16 
Courts could easily look to these agency safety standards to 
determine product defects.  As one example, the NHTSA recently 
passed a safety standard requiring that all “vehicles under 
10,000 pounds . . . manufactured on or after May 1, 
2018 . . . come equipped with rear visibility technology . . . to 
enable the driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the 
vehicle to reduce death and injury resulting from backover 
incidents.”17  This regulation could be the basis for whether a 
defect exists if a plaintiff is hurt by a backover accident. 
 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings”). 
11 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012). 
12 Id. § 30101(1). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1) (2012). 
14 Id. § 2056(a). 
15 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1) (2012). 
16 Id. §§ 371(a), 393(d)(2)(A)–(D). 
17 Press Release, NHTSA, NHTSA Announces Final Rule Requiring Rear 
Visibility Technology (Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter NHTSA Press Release], 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2014/NHTSA+Announces+Fin
al+Rule+Requiring+Rear+Visibility+Technology. The ability to promulgate safety 
standards and regulations enables an agency to regulate proactively—to ensure that 
a product is safe from the start. The drivers in vehicles equipped with the 
mandatory back-up camera will be better able to avoid backover crashes. Although 
the potential for proactivity exists, in practice it will not always happen. Oftentimes, 
the agency may not realize the need for a safety standard until people have been 
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And courts do look to regulations like this to an extent.  If a 
car involved in a backover accident lacked rear visibility 
technology as mandated by this regulation, then the car would be 
defective as a matter of law.  This is the application of negligence 
per se to the products liability context.18  Under negligence per 
se, an appropriate statute or regulation can define reasonable 
conduct,19 and any violation of such a statute constitutes 
unreasonable conduct as a matter of law.20  Applied to the 
products liability context, an agency safety standard defines 
defectiveness and a violation of it establishes defect as a matter 
of law.21 
A violation of a safety standard establishes a defect, but 
compliance lacks the same effect.  Under general negligence per 
se principles, compliance with a statute “does not prevent a 
 
hurt and/or have sued the manufacturer. Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of 
Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 
1161 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations] (“The tort 
system also spurs government to act upon discovery of the otherwise undetectable 
risks associated with products.”). Professor Schwartz offered asbestos, the Dalkon 
Shield, and cigarette lighters as three examples of products “that first became 
known through the tort system and later were regulated by the government.” Id. at 
1161–62. The NHTSA knew of the need to mandate back-up cameras because, on 
average, backover crashes cause 210 deaths and 15,000 injuries per year. NHTSA 
Press Release, supra note 17. 
18 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (“The rule in Subsection (a) that noncompliance with an appropriate 
governmental product safety regulation renders a product defective in design or 
defective because of inadequate warnings or instructions finds its origin in a 
common-law rule holding that the unexcused omission of a statutory safety 
requirement is negligence per se.”). 
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (listing the 
requirements for when “a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation” can 
be adopted as the standard of care); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. 
& EMOT. HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that an actor is negligent if he 
“violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s 
conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is 
designed to protect”). 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(1) (“The unexcused violation of a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court 
as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (explaining that an 
actor is negligent if he violates “a statute that is designed to protect against the type 
of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of 
persons the statute is designed to protect”). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a) (“[A] product’s 
noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative 
regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks sought to be 
reduced by the statute or regulation.”). 
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finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take 
additional precautions.”22  Similarly, “a product’s compliance 
with an applicable product safety statute or administrative 
regulation . . . does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of 
product defect.”23  If a manufacturer uses an agency-approved 
design or warning, that is, at best, evidence that the product is 
not defective and a layperson jury can still find liability in tort 
for a defective design. 
Many reasons exist for the lack of deference to regulatory 
compliance.24  One main reason is based on the following 
hypothetical.  Suppose an agency-required warning warns of 
risks X and Y, but not Z.  There are two possible reasons why the 
agency did not require a warning about risk Z.  The agency “may 
have considered risk Z too insignificant to warrant a warning,” or 
“the agency may not have considered risk Z at all.”25  If “the 
agency did not consider the risk and did not apply its expertise, 
its silence should be meaningless in resolving the tort action.”26  
Put another way, “when the administrator has passed no 
judgment on the problem before the court, the administrative 
process can furnish no acceptable criteria of care.”27  Because of 
this possibility—that the agency never even considered the risk— 
 
 
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C. 
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(b). 
24 Professor Owen summarized those reasons: 
[A]rguments favoring [the regulatory compliance] defense are more than 
offset by a large number of problems: statutes (and sometimes regulations) 
tend to be abstract, vague, limited in scope, and incapable of adequately 
addressing the myriad factual situations that may arise in individual cases; 
conversely, regulations may be so narrow and specific that they fail to 
capture related matters at the margins of the regulation, leaving large 
categories of similar matters unregulated; statutes and regulations are 
difficult to amend to reflect changes over time, and those dealing with 
science and technology quickly become obsolete; statutes and regulations 
both may be shaped more by lobbyists for the regulated parties than by 
detached and objective decisionmakers neutrally balancing all affected 
interests in pursuit of optimal safety; and, unlike the inherent flexibility of 
the common law, the rigidity of regulatory safety standards tends to stifle 
creativity and innovation. 
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4, at 870 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter 
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY]. 
25 Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 17, at 1132. 
26 Id. 
27 Clarence Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence 
Actions, 28 TEX. L. REV. 143, 167 (1949). 
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commentators argue and courts agree that compliance with 
agency regulations cannot conclusively show the absence of a 
defect.28  Instead, we leave the question of defect to juries.29 
Another problem with deference is that regulations are not 
specific enough to the alleged defect or injury at issue: 
Because the circumstances of cases vary, courts often find that 
the exigencies of a case fall outside the “normal” or “optimum” 
circumstances covered by the statute.  In product cases, courts 
may find that the product poses special risks and that the broad 
regulation covering many products does not account for those 
special risks.30 
If the regulation is not specific, it is irrelevant to defectiveness. 
Similarly, the lack of a regulation is irrelevant to 
defectiveness; no court has found that the absence of a standard 
is relevant to showing the lack of a defect.  Suppose a plaintiff 
alleges that a lawnmower engine is defective because it does not 
stop within ten seconds.  If no agency standard regulates how 
fast a lawnmower engine must stop, that absence of a standard 
will not help the defendant show its engine is not defective. 
Some states have, by statute, created greater deference to 
compliance with agency standards.31  For example, Indiana and 
Texas mandate a rebuttable presumption of no defect if the 
manufacturer complied with applicable safety standards.32  Such 
states, however, still leave room for the plaintiff to show defect 
and negate any increased deference.  Indiana’s statute allows the 
plaintiff to rebut the presumption if the plaintiff can “establish 




28 See id. at 162–63. 
29 Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 17, at 1132–33 
(“Traditionally, courts have avoided the issue of agency silence largely by ignoring 
it.”). 
30 Id. at 1143 (footnotes omitted). 
31 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-205 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 
(2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1256 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (West 
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01.3-09 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, 
§ 57.2 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-
703 (West 2008). 
32 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.008 
(West 2003). 
33 Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000). 
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to rebut the presumption if she shows that the safety standard 
was “inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of 
injury or damage.”34 
Because of the exceptions, these statutes do not really alter 
the common law.  With or without the presumption, the plaintiff 
has the burden to establish defect.  And the way the plaintiff 
does so is the same regardless of the presumption.  Take 
Indiana’s presumption, for example.  The plaintiff has to show a 
safer alternative either (1) to establish defect under the risk-
utility test if no presumption exists35 or (2) to establish defect to 
overwhelm the presumption.36  Thus, the way the plaintiff rebuts 
the presumption is the same way the plaintiff would establish 
defect without the presumption.  Although not yet interpreted by 
case law, the same is likely true of Texas’s exception.  Regardless 
of the presumption, the plaintiff will want to establish that the 
product designed as is—in compliance with applicable 
regulations—poses unreasonable dangers to the public and that a 
safer design exists.  The presumption does not make the 
plaintiff’s case any more difficult, nor does the presumption make 
it any more likely that the defendant will prevail.  Thus, even 
states that appear to mandate deference really do not do so. 
Leaving the question of defectiveness to juries sacrifices the 
possible uniformity that would result from agency deference.  For 
instance, deference to an FDA-approved warning would provide a 
uniform standard regarding the warning’s adequacy.37  But no 
such deference exists.  As it now stands, “states can reach 
dramatically different results in terms of whether the plaintiff 
 
34 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 82.008(b)(1). 
35 See Weigle v. SPX Corp., 729 F.3d 724, 734 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing 
Indiana’s test for design defect, which, in practice, is a risk-utility test possibly 
requiring evidence of a reasonable alternative design). 
36 Rogers, 737 N.E.2d at 1166–67. 
37 Uniformity is one reason why courts and academics claim that tort liability 
for failure to recall should be based on an agency order to recall. There are other 
advantages and disadvantages to a regulatory defense less relevant to this Article 
that have been debated by academics elsewhere. See generally, Ausness, supra note 
6; Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 175 (1989); David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products 
Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV. 1 (2005); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory 
Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the Two, 30 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Striking the Right 
Balance]; Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: 
Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000). 
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has raised a jury question on the issue of design defect.”38  This 
consequence “may well induce manufacturers to simply ignore 
tort doctrine in individual states.”39  Manufacturers just pay the 
damages to the plaintiffs who can establish defect and do not 
alter the design.40  This would not be possible if states had more 
uniform standards, which would result from deference to agency 
safety standards.  But courts have left defectiveness for juries to 
decide. 
B. No Deference on Decisions To Require Post-Sale Warnings 
In 1998, the Third Restatement of Torts: Products Liability 
helped awaken a debate about whether tort law should also 
impose liability for a manufacturer’s post-sale conduct.  
Criticized for not restating the law so much as defining it, the 
Third Restatement includes a post-sale duty to warn, imposing 
liability for a manufacturer’s failure to issue a post-sale warning 
of dangers discoverable after the product is sold.41 
Liability for post-sale conduct may seem unnecessary if a 
plaintiff can already establish that the product was defective at 
the time of sale.42  Some products, however, may not be defective 
 
38 Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort 
Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 928 (1996). 
39 Id. at 930. 
40 Tort law could conceivably require a design change if the court issued 
injunctive relief. Such relief generally will not be available, however, as legal 
damages are typically adequate. “Courts prefer money damages to equitable 
remedies whenever such awards provide adequate relief.” Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 
130 F.R.D. 260, 266 (D.D.C. 1990) (denying class certification to plaintiffs seeking 
injunction forcing the defendant to recall and retrofit allegedly defective product 
because money damages were adequate); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 938 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[I]f all that is needed is a judgment for damages, 
an injunction is normally not the more appropriate remedy.”). A products claim is for 
the personal injuries the plaintiff suffers or the property damage the plaintiff may 
have suffered. Damages traditionally and adequately compensate these injuries, and 
thus, an injunction would be inappropriate. See, e.g., Rhynes v. Stryker Corp., No. 
10-5619 SC, 2011 WL 2149095, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (denying request for 
injunctive relief to prevent further alleged misrepresentations regarding product 
because money damages would provide adequate remedy for injury due to product); 
Adams v. I-Flow Corp., No. CV09-09550 R(SSx), 2010 WL 1339948, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 30, 2010) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 938 cmt. b 
(listing the few areas of substantive tort law that give rise to claims for injunctive 
relief instead of damages and not listing a products liability claim). 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
42 Courts that have adopted a post-sale duty to warn differ regarding whether 
the later-discovered danger—triggering the need for a warning—must be related to 
a defect existing at the time of sale. Under the Restatement view, a post-sale duty to 
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under the traditional tests at the time of sale.  It may not be until 
later that the product’s danger is discoverable.  If this is true and 
the product hurts a plaintiff, her only chance at recovering 
damages in tort is if the jurisdiction recognizes liability for post-
sale conduct.43  A majority of states now do so.44 
But states take a cautious approach.  A post-sale warning 
campaign would be very burdensome for manufacturers, as it 
would involve costs associated with identifying those who need to 
be warned and then actually warning them.45  Courts do not 
want to impose liability for a manufacturer’s failure to undertake 
such a burdensome, and thus possibly unreasonable, precaution.  
Thus, the Restatement rule is factually dependent and fault 
based.  Liability for a failure to warn post sale is proper only if a 







warn exists “whether or not the product is defective at the time of original sale.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a. Some states, however, 
have required that a latent and undetectable design defect exist at the time of sale 
for a manufacturer to owe a duty to warn of the later-revealed danger. See, e.g., 
Romero v. Int’l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting 
Colorado law as limiting the post-sale duty to warn to “defects in design, existing but 
unknown or unappreciated at the time of the original sale, which are subsequently 
discovered by the manufacturer”); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 
1299, 1313 (Kan. 1993) (recognizing a post-sale duty to warn “when a defect, which 
originated at the time the product was manufactured[,]” is later discovered). In such 
states, liability for the post-sale warning is superfluous in that the plaintiff will 
already be able to recover her damages. 
43 In a jurisdiction that recognizes only point-of-sale liability, “[a] defendant 
cannot be liable for failing to warn of dangers that were unforeseeable at the time of 
the sale,” with the exception of conduct falling under strict liability. Jill Wieber 
Lens, Warning: A Post-Sale Duty To Warn Targets Small Manufacturers, 5 UTAH L. 
REV. 1013, 1016 (2014). In contrast, a jurisdiction that acknowledges post-sale 
liability recognizes a manufacturer’s duty to warn of a new danger if the 
manufacturer discovered or should have discovered the danger after the sale. Id. at 
1018. 
44 See id. at 1020 n.24 (listing states that have adopted some version of a post-
sale duty to warn). 
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (explaining that 
courts must consider the “serious potential for overburdening sellers” when 
examining whether to impose the post-sale duty). 
FINAL_LENS 10/12/2016  8:40 AM 
340 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:329   
warning.46  Whether a reasonable manufacturer would have done 
so depends on the risk posed by the product and the costs 
associated with issuing a post-sale warning.47 
Another way courts could proceed with caution in imposing 
liability for post-sale warnings is by deferring to agency action.  
Congress can empower an agency to require manufacturers to 
notify product users of dangers that emerge after the time of 
sale.48  As an example, assuming a “substantial product hazard” 
exists, the CPSC can require a manufacturer “[t]o give public 
notice of the defect or failure to comply, including posting clear 
and conspicuous notice on its Internet website[] [and] providing 
notice to any third party Internet website on which such 
manufacturer . . . has placed the product for sale.”49  The CPSC 
can also require a manufacturer “[t]o mail notice to every person 
to whom the person required to give notice knows such product 
was delivered or sold.”50  Before requiring a post-sale warning, 
the agency would have evaluated the costs of that warning.   
 
 
46 Id. § 10(a); see also Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty To Warn: Two 
Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 896 
(1983) (explaining that “cost should be considered in determining whether a 
manufacturer has made a reasonable effort to warn product users” and that “the 
facts of a particular case . . . should all be relevant in determining” liability for post-
sale failure to warn). 
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. i. 
48 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c) (2012). 
49 Id. § 2064(c)(1)(D). 
50 Id. § 2064(c)(1)(F). The NHTSA also has a limited ability to order a post-sale 
warning. After the NHTSA makes the initial determination of a defect, it must give 
the manufacturer an opportunity to explain that the product is not defective or does 
not affect motor vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30118(b)(1) (West 2015). During this 
time, the Secretary of Transportation may settle with the manufacturer for a lesser 
remedy, such as a post-sale warning. This exact scenario was the subject of Center 
for Auto Safety v. Lewis, where the court upheld the agency’s requirement of the 
manufacturer to send owners of certain automobiles notice of the alleged 
transmission defect along with a warning to not leave the automobile with the 
engine running. 685 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Notably, however, the NHTSA may 
be able to require just a post-sale warning—and not an additional remedy, such as 
replacement—if a defective vehicle is over fifteen years old, or if a defective tire was 
purchased more than five years prior to the determination of defect. See 
49 U.S.C.A. § 30120(g) (West 2015). The FDA also can require post-sale warnings in 
certain circumstances. The FDA can require a change to a warning when it is 
misbranded or adulterated. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2012). Additionally, 
“[m]anufacturers and distributors of drugs and the Food and Drug Administration 
occasionally are required to mail important information about drugs to physicians 
and others responsible for patient care.” 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2016). 
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Courts could thus defer to agency decisions that the warning 
itself was reasonable and the costs justified, and impose liability 
only when the agency had so acted. 
But no one seems to acknowledge this opportunity for 
deference.  The only mention of agency-required post-sale 
warnings is buried in the comments to the Third Restatement 
provision regarding the effect of violations of or compliance with 
agency safety standards.51  The commentary clarifies that this 
Third Restatement provision is limited to agency safety 
standards: 
Conduct involving products but not related to product defect 
may also be governed by statute or regulation.  For 
example . . . statutes or regulations may govern such matters as 
post-sale warnings or recalls.  When and whether liability arises 
when there has been noncompliance or compliance with such 
statutes or regulations is governed by Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 286–288C.52 
The referenced Second Restatement sections are the basic 
negligence per se rules, which easily apply to an agency order to 
issue a post-sale warning.  An agency orders a post-sale warning 
to protect users of the product and to help prevent those users 
from being injured by the defective product.53  If an agency 
ordered a manufacturer to issue a post-sale warning and the 
manufacturer failed to comply with that requirement, the 
manufacturer will have violated an agency regulation and will 




51 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
52 Id. § 4 cmt. f. This comment obviously also refers to regulations that may 
govern product recalls. But compliance and noncompliance with agency recall orders 
is not governed by the Second Restatement’s negligence per se rules; it is governed 
by the Third Restatement’s § 11. See infra Section II.A. 
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (describing 
the requirements for a statute to define the standard of care under negligence per 
se). 
54 One exception would be if the post-sale warning requirement was vague, like 
if the agency simply ordered the manufacturer to act reasonably and notify its 
customers. See Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 1987) 
(explaining that “in order to invoke the statute or regulation as a standard the 
statute or regulation must prescribe or proscribe specific conduct” and that “[u]sing 
the statute or regulation as a standard is not appropriate if it sets out only a general 
or abstract standard of care”). 
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Applying negligence per se principles further, if the agency 
ordered the post-sale warning and the manufacturer complied, 
the manufacturer could still later be found to have acted 
unreasonably in a products claim.55  Compliance with agency 
action is not a shield from tort liability.56 
If the agency never required a post-sale warning, however, 
no agency regulation is implicated and negligence per se cannot 
apply.  For a regulation to substitute as the standard of care and 
define reasonable conduct, the regulation must be intended to 
benefit a class of persons including the plaintiff and it must be 
designed to prevent the type of accident that injured the 
plaintiff.57  These negligence per se requirements assume a 
positive, affirmative regulation.  The lack of an order from an 
agency requiring a post-sale warning—really, inaction or agency 
silence—cannot meet these negligence per se requirements. 
The manufacturer could creatively argue that it technically 
complied with a regulation—it was never ordered to issue a post-
sale warning and thus did not do so.  But even if the 
manufacturer could convince a court that this was compliance, 
compliance with an agency requirement does not establish 
reasonable conduct.  It “does not prevent a finding of negligence 
where a reasonable [manufacturer] would take additional 
precautions.”58 
Either way, courts give no deference to agency inaction, that 
is, to not ordering a post-sale warning.  If negligence per se is 
inapplicable, the jury can obviously find the manufacturer 
unreasonable.  And if the manufacturer’s inaction—not issuing a 
post-sale warning—is considered as compliance with agency 
inaction, compliance does not equal reasonable conduct.  A jury is 
still free to find that the manufacturer acted unreasonably even 
though it technically “complied” with agency regulations. 
 
 
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C. 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 16; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C. 
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286. 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C. 
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Depending upon the circumstances, the costs of a post-sale 
warning can be excessive.59  Presumably, an administrative 
agency could evaluate those costs better than courts, and could 
better weigh them against the risk to users of the product if not 
warned, meaning deference to agencies might be appropriate.  
Deference would also improve uniformity in that only 
government agencies would define the reasonableness of 
expensive post-sale warnings.  But courts ignore the agency’s 
possible superior ability in this area and give no deference to an 
agency’s not ordering a post-sale warning.  The manufacturer can 
be found unreasonable for not issuing a post-sale warning even 
though an agency never ordered the manufacturer to do so. 
C. No Deference Within Determinations of Whether and How To 
Punish 
Tort law’s main remedy is compensatory damages, which 
compensate the plaintiff for her injury.60  If the plaintiff is able to 
establish defect, or unreasonable conduct in failing to issue a 
post-sale warning, she will receive compensation based on the 
extent of her injury caused by that defect or unreasonable 
conduct.  Tort law also recognizes another remedy, punitive 







59 Courts and academics both consider a post-sale warning campaign generally 
expensive, and perhaps prohibitively so. See, e.g., Modelski v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 
Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“[T]he law does not contemplate 
placing the onerous duty on manufacturers to subsequently warn all foreseeable 
users of products . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a 
(describing the “daunting” “costs of identifying and communicating with product 
users years after sale”). But the specific costs will depend on the factual 
circumstances of how many people there are to warn and the method of that 
warning. In a challenge to an NHTSA recall order decades ago, Ford asserted that 
the cost of merely giving notice of the defect to all present owners would exceed 
$500,000. Ford Motor Co. v. Coleman, 402 F. Supp. 475, 494 (D.D.C. 1975) (Hart, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 425 U.S. 927 (1976). 
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(explaining that the aim of compensatory damages is to put the injured plaintiff “in 
a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort”). 
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deter tortfeasors.61  Because of these purposes, punitive damages 
are available only if the defendant acts with an evil intent or its 
conduct evidences a reckless disregard for the safety of others.62 
As with liability determinations for compensatory damages, 
opportunities for deference to agency actions exist within 
determinations of whether to impose punitive damages.  Maybe a 
violation of agency action could automatically trigger the 
availability of punitive damages, or compliance with a regulation 
could automatically render punitive damages unavailable. 
However, no such deference exists.  A violation of safety 
standards does not render punishment automatic.63  A violation 
of such standards can be the basis of a punitive damage award, 
but it is frequently a basis only when the violation is knowing or 
intentional.64  And even with a knowing violation, punitive 
damages are not automatically available.  Despite the initial 
appeal of a rule that automatically punishes defendants for 
intentional safety standard violations,65 “a manufacturer’s 
decision to violate a product safety standard may be far less 
culpable than a decision to expose consumers to an unreasonable 
risk of harm.”66  For instance, the “safety standard may be more 
stringent than is actually required for the public safety,”67 or it 
“may be essentially worthless or may even create more hazards 





61 Id. § 908(1). Initially, some questioned whether punitive damages should be 
available in a products liability claim. That thought has been overwhelmingly 
rejected and punitive damages are recoverable if the plaintiff can establish their 
propriety. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1270–71 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages]. 
Additionally, modern definitions of design and warning defects are fault based, 
again reinforcing the compatibility of punitive damages with products claims. 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2). 
63 Id. 
64 Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 61, at 1335. 
65 Id. at 1337 (“There is substantial initial appeal to reasoning that an 
intentional violation of a product safety standard, especially one promulgated by a 
legislative body, that injures a consumer is ipso facto an intentional violation of the 
consumer’s rights . . . and that therefore the manufacturer should automatically be 
liable for punitive damages.”). 
66 Id. at 1338. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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ago explained that the jury should be able to consider a safety 
standard violation when deciding whether and to what extent to 
punish, but no per se rule should exist.69 
Similarly, compliance with agency safety standards does not 
render punitive damages unavailable.70  “The basic concept of the 
compliance-with-law punitive damages defense appears logical 
and fair, for ordinarily a manufacturer or other product supplier 
is far from quasi-criminal in doing what the government 
explicitly permitted or required it to do.”71  But again, many 
reasons exist why a deferential per se rule would be 
inappropriate.  Agencies “often have much less information than 
manufacturers on specific safety problems” and agencies “move 
much more slowly and with far less flexibility than private 
manufacturers.”72  Safety standards necessarily set only a 
minimum safety level and a manufacturer could easily comply 
with them yet still act in a way that should be punished.  Thus, 
courts do not defer to agency safety standards as a basis for 
imposing punitive damages. 
Along the same lines, courts do not defer to agency orders on 
post-sale warnings within the punishment context.  A violation of 
a post-sale warning order would show unreasonable conduct as a 
matter of law,73 but it would not render punitive damages 
automatically available.  And even if an agency never requires  
 
 
69 Id. at 1339. 
70 As with statutorily enhanced deference to compliance with agency regulations 
in determinations of defect, discussed supra Section I.A., some states have also 
increased the amount of deference given to compliance with agency regulations in 
the punitive damages context. For example, Ohio prohibits liability for punitive 
damages “if the manufacturer . . . fully complied with all applicable government 
safety and performance standards . . . relative to the product’s . . . design or 
formulation, [and] adequate warnings or instructions . . . .” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2307.80(D)(1) (West 2004); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2107 (West 
1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104(b) (2011). Other states have more specific 
statutes precluding liability for punitive damages if the product complied with FDA 
regulations. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:58C-5 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)(1)(a); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 30.927 (West 1987). But even this deference is limited as exceptions exist. 
For example, under Ohio law, a plaintiff can still obtain punitive damages if she can 
show that the manufacturer withheld material information from the government 
agency. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(D)(2). 
71 2 DAVID G OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 305 (3rd 
ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN & OWEN]. 
72 Id. at 306. 
73 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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the manufacturer to issue a post-sale warning, a manufacturer’s 
failure to do so is frequently the basis of a punitive damages 
award.74 
The lack of deference to agency safety standards again 
sacrifices possible uniformity.  Deference could also enable 
predictability.  Manufacturers would know that their violations 
could trigger punitive damages; they could have the comfort of 
knowing that they would not be punished in tort as long as they 
complied.  But no such deference exists.  Manufacturers can still 
be found liable for compensatory and punitive damages even if 
they comply with applicable agency regulations. 
II. YET COMPLETE DEFERENCE ON RECALL ORDERS 
Although courts refuse to defer to agency safety standards to 
determine defect, courts are eager to defer to agency orders on 
product recalls.  Courts are so eager to defer, in fact, that they 
recognize only very narrow bases for tort liability that depend on 
an agency ordering or encouraging a recall.  In effect, courts look 
to agencies to determine the reasonableness of a recall; a recall 
would have been reasonable if an agency ordered one, but not if 
the agency did not order one.  This extensive deference is illogical 
given that it includes deference to agency inaction—that is, to an 
agency not ordering a recall.  Ultimately, there is nothing so 
special about product recalls to merit this level of deference. 
A. Narrow Bases for Tort Liability Related to Product Recalls 
Courts recognize only very narrow bases of tort liability 
related to product recalls,75 both of which depend on agency 
action.  The reason for this limited liability is courts’ belief that 
agencies are better equipped to evaluate whether the safety 
benefits of a recall justify the costs. 
 
74 Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 61, at 1352–61 (describing the questions 
raised by cases in which a defect is discovered post sale). 
75 A product “recall” can actually mean multiple things. “[N]o consistent usage 
unites this word as it appears in the United States Code and the Code of Federal 
Regulations.” Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359, 362 
(2013). For purposes of this Article, a recall is “a notification to consumers of a 
product hazard and procedures for accomplishing its repair” at the manufacturer’s 
expense. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 24, § 10.8, at 705. The offer to fix 
the product, often called retrofitting, is a necessary part of this definition as it 
distinguishes a recall from a post-sale warning of a product’s danger. 
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1. Agency Action as a Prerequisite 
Tort liability related to product recalls is very limited.  The 
Restatement recognizes only narrow circumstances in which a 
manufacturer can be liable for failing to undertake a recall.  
Specifically, the Third Restatement dictates that a manufacturer 
can be liable for injury or damage caused by a seller’s failure to 
act reasonably in recalling a product in only two circumstances: if 
(1) “a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or 
administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or 
distributor to recall the product,” or (2) the manufacturer 
voluntarily “undertakes to recall the product” when not required 
to do so.76 
The first instance of potential liability occurs when a 
manufacturer violates a recall ordered by the government.  
Liability is possible both for a violation of the directive and for a 
“failure reasonably to comply with the relevant directive.”77  An 
agency’s power to order a recall derives from Congress.  For 
instance, Congress mandates that the National Highway Traffis 
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) order a product recall if the 
agency finds a defect creating an “unreasonable risk of injury.”78  
 
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). A 
few states recognize broader liability. California law “recognizes a common law duty 
to recall or retrofit even in the absence of an order from a government agency.” 
Roberts v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. CV 12-1644 CAS (VBKx), 2013 WL 
7753579, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013); see also Hernandez v. Badger Constr. 
Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 755 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding substantial evidence of 
negligence in failing to recall when the manufacturer “decided not to try to retrofit 
with ATBDs cranes it had already sold or notify owners of previously sold cranes 
about its decision to make ATBDs standard equipment”). Georgia courts have also 
recognized liability for a failure to initiate a recall even if one was not ordered. See 
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 636 (Ga. 1993) (explaining that the 
jury returned a special verdict finding that the defendant was liable for “negligent 
failure to recall or warn”). 
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. b. This basis of 
liability has been criticized because of the rarity of a government-ordered recall. 
Bernstein, supra note 75, at 367 (explaining that a government-ordered recall 
“almost never happens”); see also James T. O’Reilly, Product Recalls & the Third 
Restatement: Consumers Lose Twice from Defects in Products and in the Restatement 
Itself, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 883, 891 (2003) (“The fact is that section 11(a)(1) will not 
apply to virtually any of the product recalls performed every year.”). 
78 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 30118 (West 2015); § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle 
safety” to “mean[] the performance of a motor vehicle . . . in a way that protects the 
public against . . . against unreasonable risk of . . . injury in an accident”). Congress 
similarly empowered the CPSC to order a recall under prescribed circumstances. 
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(4), (c)(1) (2012). The FDA’s recall powers differ depending on the 
product. The FDA has authority to order a recall of medical devices and some foods 
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Tort liability based on a violation of the agency directive is really 
just a recall-specific form of negligence per se;79 the directive 
substitutes as the standard of care and a violation of it 
establishes unreasonable conduct.  If an agency orders a product 
recall, but the manufacturer “unreasonably fails to notify 
[product] owners, whom it can reasonably identify, about the 
recall,”80 the manufacturer could face tort liability for any 
damages caused by that violation of the agency order. 
The second instance of potential tort liability occurs when a 
manufacturer voluntarily recalls its product even though it was 
not required to do so.81  If a manufacturer voluntarily undertakes 
a recall, the manufacturer is obligated to act reasonably within 
that recall and can face liability if it fails to do so.  For instance, 
if a manufacturer voluntarily recalls but “thereafter 
unreasonably fails to notify owners whom it can reasonably 
identify about the recall,” it could be liable.82 
An additional note on this second instance is necessary.  The 
Third Restatement does not consider these voluntary recalls to 
actually be voluntary.  “[C]ourts appear to assume that voluntary 
recalls are typically undertaken in the anticipation that, if the 
seller does not recall voluntarily, it will be directed to do so by a 
governmental regulator.”83  Thus, even voluntary recalls, which 





but, surprisingly, has little authority to order a recall of the other products under its 
jurisdiction. Bernstein, supra note 75, at 364. 
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. b; see also infra 
notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. b, illus. 2. The 
author was unable to locate any case where a manufacturer was sued under this 
provision for simply not obeying a government directive to recall. 
81 This is similar to traditional tort law imposing a duty, where one did not 
otherwise exist, if an actor voluntarily assumes it. The most common example is if 
an actor voluntarily helps another in need. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. c, illus. 4. This basis 
of liability has also been criticized because it is rarely used. Bernstein, supra note 
75, at 369 (“Manufacturers are virtually never held liable for that breach of duty. 
Similarly—and unsurprisingly—case law presents very few illustrations of the 
maladroit recall, where a manufacturer undertakes this post-sale rectification but 
performs it negligently.”). 
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. c. 
FINAL_LENS 10/12/2016  8:40 AM 
2016] PRODUCT RECALLS 349 
agency action.  Additionally, agencies are still involved in these 
voluntary recalls because they oversee and coordinate the recalls 
with the manufacturers.84 
Because of agency involvement even in voluntary recalls, the 
reality is that the Restatement does not impose any tort liability 
related to recalls unless an agency has been involved with the 
recall in some way—either ordering an involuntary one, or being 
about to do so and motivating the manufacturer to undertake a 
voluntary one.  Except in the uncommon case of purely voluntary 
recalls, if an agency does not act, tort liability cannot exist. 
Not surprisingly, current tort law does not appear to 
incentivize a product recall.  Certainly, the manufacturer is 
motivated to recall if ordered or encouraged to do so by the 
government.  In that instance, the manufacturer could face tort 
liability if it acts unreasonably within that recall.  But without 
government action, the manufacturer may be better off not 
recalling.  There is no chance of tort liability based on such 
inaction.  The lack of liability means tort law provides no direct 
incentive for a manufacturer to recall a product.  Why would the 
manufacturer do so?  Again, there is no chance of liability based 
on the decision to not recall,85 as long as an agency never ordered 
one. 
 
84 For example, a vehicle manufacturer is required to inform the NHTSA when 
it undertakes a recall on its own. See 49 C.F.R. § 573.6(a) (2014). The manufacturer 
must identify the defect and what vehicles are being recalled. Id. § 573.6(c)(2). It 
must also describe the plan for “remedying the defect.” Id. § 573.6(c)(8)(i). 
85 Failure to recall could be the basis for punitive damages, however. See infra 
Section II.B. This possibility could incentivize a recall. Also, already existing liability 
for pre-sale defects could motivate a recall. If the product is defective and the 
manufacturer recalls it, the plaintiff could get his product fixed. “A prompt recall can 
prevent injuries and thus reduce, although not eliminate entirely, product liability 
claims.” Teresa M. Schwartz & Robert S. Adler, Product Recalls: A Remedy in Need 
of Repair, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 416 (1984). Even if the plaintiff does not get 
the product fixed, the fact of the recall will be advantageous to the manufacturer in 
any litigation against it because a plaintiff’s failure to follow recall guidance can 
reduce her recovery wholly or partially. Specifically, the plaintiff’s “failure to bring 
[the product] in for repair is relevant to the issue of legal causation . . . and the issue 
of comparative responsibility.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 
cmt. d, illus. 5. Relevant to legal causation, the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the 
recall could constitute a superseding cause, an unforeseeable intervening cause that 
precludes the manufacturer’s liability. Id. § 15 cmt. b, illus. 2 (illustrating that a 
plaintiff’s modification of and failure to repair a product could be “sufficiently 
unforeseeable [so] that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing 
the . . . injury”). Or, relevant to comparative responsibility, the jury may find that 
the plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to respond to the recall. Depending on the 
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2. Due to Courts’ Perceived Inadequacy 
The next question is why tort liability related to recalls is so 
limited.  The answer is not federal preemption.86  No court has 
found that Congress has expressly preempted state tort law 
causes of action for failure to recall.87  Further, federal regulation 
of product safety is not so dominant so as to preclude state 
regulation, whether through local administrative action or tort 
law.88 
There is also little support for the argument that failure to 
recall liability is preempted because of its implicit conflict with 
federal law.  The first type of this implied preemption is 
impossibility preemption, which means it is impossible to comply 
 
state, this finding could negate the plaintiff’s recovery. Alternatively, the jury would 
assign some portion of fault to the plaintiff. If the portion of fault assigned is high 
enough, again depending on the state, this could negate the plaintiff’s recovery or 
reduce it. Id. § 17. 
86 Extensive analysis of the possibility of preemption of liability for failure to 
recall is outside the scope of this Article. Of the few cases where courts have found 
preemption, a majority have involved a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief forcing a 
recall as opposed to damages resulting from the failure to recall. See supra note 40 
for a discussion of why injunctive relief is generally not available in products 
liability claims. 
87 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales 
Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
[hereinafter In re Toyota Motor Corp.] (“[T]he Safety Act expressly provides that 
rights and remedies created by the Act are supplemental to rights and remedies 
provided by State law.”); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 
153 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“We first note that express preemption is 
not an issue here. Defendants point to no provision of the Safety Act explicitly 
superseding state-law-based injunctive relief.”). 
88 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1196–97 (noting that 
“[m]otor vehicle safety is an area of law traditionally regulated by the states”); 
Marsikian v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 08-04876 AHM (JTLx), 2009 WL 
8379784, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) (explaining that the regulatory field in 
question—car safety—is an area of traditional state police power); Burgo v. 
Volkswagen of America, 183 F. Supp. 2d 683, 689–90 (D.N.J. 2001) (explaining that 
Congress intended to give the federal government primary responsibility to regulate 
the automotive manufacturing industry, but not the exclusive responsibility). But 
see, e.g., Namovicz v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 582, 584 (D. Md. 
2001) (explaining that the NHTSA has the “exclusive authority” to determine if a 
defect related to motor safety exists and the effect of the Safety Act is to “completely 
preempt the area of vehicle and equipment recalls”); Coker v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., No. 01 CVS 1264, 2004 WL 32676, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2004) 
(finding tort law claim for injunctive relief to force a recall to be “solely within the 
purview of [the] NHTSA” based on “the comprehensive role that the federal 
government occupies in motor vehicle recalls”), aff’d, 617 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005), aff’d, 627 S.E.2d 461 (N.C. 2006). 
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with both federal and state law.89  An agency never issues a “do 
not recall” order, which would be the only type of order that 
would make it impossible to comply with a state law providing 
that the manufacturer should have undertaken a recall. 
Similarly, there is little argument for preemption under 
obstacle-conflict implied preemption.  This type of preemption 
exists if enforcement of the state tort law obligation would 
frustrate the purposes of federal law.  It is unclear how liability 
for failure to recall could frustrate federal law; state law liability 
actually furthers Congress’s desire to improve product safety.90  
Congress likely did not intend to create an exclusive, expert 
federal agency given the lack of expressed preemption.91 
Still, courts decline to recognize broader liability for a failure 
to recall because of deference to government agencies.  As the 







89 The Supreme Court labeled this a “demanding defense.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 573 (2009). Most courts have rejected an impossibility implied preemption 
defense to a failure to recall claim. See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 
2d at 1195–99 (refusing to find impossibility preemption based on a hypothetical 
conflict between a court order and what an agency may order); Kent v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213–15 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to 
find impossibility preemption because of a lack of a conflict between an agency order 
and a court order). 
90 Most courts have also rejected conflict preemption arguments. See, e.g., In re 
Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1198–99 (explaining that a court-ordered 
recall would not interfere with congressional intent to reduce traffic accidents and 
resulting deaths and injuries); Marsikian, 2009 WL 8379784, at *8 (finding that 
Congress “did not intend that there be an exclusive and uniform federal remedy for 
motor vehicle defects”); In re Mattel, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (“Given that the regulatory record does not indicate a clear preference for a 
bar against a state law replacement remedy, the Court cannot say that allowing a 
replacement remedy in this case ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the CPSC voluntary recall 
regulations.”); Kent, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (holding that allowing pursuit of tort 
claims will not “divert resources and attention from [the] NHTSA” nor “disturb the 
careful administrative procedure envisioned by Congress”). These courts are likely 
correct. 
91 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573–74 (rejecting argument that Congress wanted to 
create the FDA as an expert agency because, at least in part, Congress was aware of 
state tort lawsuits yet did not and has not created an express preemption provision). 
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[E]ven when a product is defective . . . an involuntary duty to 
recall should be imposed on the seller only by a governmental 
directive issued pursuant to statute or regulation.  Issues 
relating to product recalls are best evaluated by governmental 
agencies capable of gathering adequate data regarding the 
ramifications of such undertakings.92 
Similarly, commentators explain that recalls involve the 
“enormous” “cost[s] of locating, recalling, and replacing mass-
marketed products.”93  Agencies, and not courts, “are best suited 
to examine the issues attending recalls.”94  Courts repeat these 
sentiments of inferiority, concluding that they “have traditionally 
not been suited to consider the economic effect of such repair or 
recall campaigns.”95 
 
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). The commentary to the Third Restatement’s § 11 announces that “[d]uties to 
recall products impose significant burdens on manufacturers,” but it does not 
identify those burdens. Id. It does mention that later redesigns of products cannot 
trigger a duty to recall because “manufacturers would face incalculable costs every 
time they sought to make their product lines better and safer.” Id. This concern is off 
base for multiple reasons. First, a new warning or design does not automatically 
make the older warning and design defective. If it did, courts should again be 
hesitant to impose liability for warning and design defects. Similarly, a new warning 
or design would not create a need for a recall, or liability for a failure to undertake 
one. Second, liability for failure to recall would require the manufacturer to pay 
damages for injuries caused by the failure to recall, not to actually undertake a 
recall. 
93 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 901. 
94 Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-
Sale Duties To Warn, Retrofit, and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 78 (1999); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 46, at 901 (“As Congress has recognized, administrative 
agencies have the institutional resources to make fully informed assessments of the 
marginal benefits of recalling a specific product.”). But see Kevin M. McDonald, 
Recall the Recall, 33 TRANSP. L.J. 253, 262 (2006/2007) (explaining that the “NHTSA 
has never studied the effect of recalls on vehicle safety” and “hasn’t effectively 
analyzed the ‘cost’ of recalls, either”). 
95 Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1995) (footnotes 
omitted) (citation omitted) (“[W]e believe the duty to repair or recall is more properly 
a consideration for administrative agencies and the Legislature who ‘are better able 
to weigh the benefits and costs involved in locating, recalling, and retrofitting 
products,’ as well as other economic factors affecting businesses and consumers.”); 
see also In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (D.N.J. 
2007) (“Plaintiffs are essentially asking the [c]ourt to perform [a] task[] traditionally 
relegated to the FDA. The [c]ourt . . . does not have the expertise to undertake such 
a task.”); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1316 (Kan. 1993) 
(“The decision to expand a manufacturer’s post[-]sale duty beyond implementing 
reasonable efforts to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product of 
discovered latent life-threatening hazards unforeseeable at the point of sale should 
be left to administrative agencies and the legislature.”). 
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B. Presuming Reasonableness Based on Whether the Agency 
Ordered a Recall 
Courts thus completely defer to an agency’s affirmative 
recall order in that a manufacturer can be liable for failing to act 
reasonably in carrying out an ordered recall.96  Courts also 
completely defer to an agency’s not ordering of a recall in that a 
manufacturer cannot be liable in tort if the agency never 
ordered—or otherwise encouraged—a recall.97  Yet, and most 
curiously, this deference disappears in the context of punishing 
the defendant through punitive damages.98 
Within a tort claim, if the agency affirmatively ordered the 
recall, the court does not re-evaluate the recall order itself.99  
Instead, the court assumes that the agency properly ordered the 
recall because the dangers posed by the product justified the 
costs of the recall100—essentially, that a reasonable manufacturer 
 
96 See supra Section II.A.1; see also discussion infra note 99. 
97 See supra Section II.A.1. 
98 See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
99 The recall order itself can be at issue when a manufacturer directly 
challenges that recall order. This occurs in one of two ways. First, the manufacturer 
may directly challenge the order in federal court. This challenge “may be sought 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1948) (general federal question jurisdiction statute); 
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948) (federal jurisdiction over commerce issues); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(1948) (Declaratory Judgment Act); and terms of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966).” Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-
Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1301, 1320 n.95 (2001). Alternatively, the 
manufacturer may choose to just ignore the recall order in which case the agency’s 
only method of enforcing it is to go to court. Per statute, the agency can refer the 
matter to the U.S. Attorney General, and the Attorney General may bring a civil 
action in federal court to enjoin “a violation of this chapter . . . or order issued under 
this chapter.” 49 U.S.C. § 30163(a)(1) (2012). In those cases, courts apply a test just 
like the Hand formula. See discussion infra note 128. Specifically, courts evaluate an 
NHTSA recall order based on “(1) the severity of the harm it threatens; (2) the 
frequency with which that harm occurs in the threatened population relative to its 
incidence in the general population; and (3) the economic, social, and safety 
consequences of reducing the risk to a so-called ‘reasonable’ level.” United States v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1555, 1578 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988). But the recall order itself would not be subject to challenge in a tort claim 
for failure to act reasonably within a government-ordered recall. 
100 The agency’s evaluation of the costs of a product recall may be exaggerated. 
See McDonald, supra note 94 (explaining that the “NHTSA has never studied the 
effect of recalls on vehicle safety” and “hasn’t effectively analyzed the ‘cost’ of recalls, 
either”). Nothing in Congress’s empowerment of the NHTSA to order a recall 
expressly requires, or even allows, the agency to consider the costs of recalling the 
product. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 30118(a) (West 2015) (enabling a product recall if the 
vehicle contains “a defect related to motor vehicle safety or does not comply with an 
applicable motor vehicle safety standard”); § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle 
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would have recalled the product.  The tort claim thus focuses not 
on the propriety of ordering the recall but rather on whether the 
manufacturer acted reasonably within the ordered recall.  If the 
manufacturer violated the recall order itself, that violation would 
conclusively establish unreasonable conduct via negligence per 
se.101  Or, the allegations of negligence may be based on the 
manufacturer not acting reasonably in contacting those at risk, 
and that would be the focus of the case.  But the manufacturer is 
unable to challenge the need to do the recall in the first place; the 
reasonableness of the recall is essentially presumed based on 
deference to the agency’s order. 
If the agency never ordered a recall, courts, due to their 
inability to evaluate the costs of a product recall, essentially 
presume that a recall would not have been reasonable.  Courts 
believe that recalls are so complicated and expensive that courts 
are unable to consider whether a manufacturer should have 
undertaken one.  Only government agencies are able to evaluate 
whether the dangers posed by the product justified the costs of a 
recall, the same inquiry as to whether a reasonable manufacturer 
would have recalled the product.  No agency ever ordered a 
recall, meaning no agency ever decided that a reasonable 
manufacturer would have recalled the product.  Therefore, courts 
necessarily presume that a recall would not have been reasonable 
and deny potential tort liability for the unordered and untaken 
recall. 
Thus, courts interpret an agency’s lack of a positive 
declaration that a recall is justified to be a declaration that a 
recall was not justified.  The manufacturer’s failure to do a recall 
on its own technically complies with the agency’s lack of a 
 
safety” to “mean[] the performance of a motor vehicle . . . in a way that protects the 
public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, 
construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of 
death or injury in an accident”). The irrelevance of costs is also clear in the recall 
order the court affirmed in United States v. General Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). There, the court assumed to be true that the defect would cause 
“between less than one and three injuries in the future” and “that the number of 
future plug failures will be negligible.” Id. at 758. Additionally, most people already 
injured by the defect had not suffered severe injury. Still, the court enforced the 
NHTSA’s recall order—to prevent about three nonserious injuries. Id. at 759. 
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The 
unexcused violation of . . . an administrative regulation[,] which is adopted by the 
court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in 
itself.”). 
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declaration.  In this context, that compliance is not merely “a 
piece of the evidentiary puzzle” of whether the manufacturer 
acted reasonably; it is instead “an impenetrable shield from 
liability” based on a failure to recall.102 
One exception exists though.  The lack of an agency recall 
order is not an impenetrable shield from liability for punitive 
damages.  A manufacturer can be punished for failing to recall a 
product even though no agency ever ordered it to do so.  The 
deferential treatment and presumed unreasonableness of the 
recall disappears if the question is whether to punish the 
defendant for not recalling the product.103 
As a practical matter, failure-to-recall punitive damages may 
be imposed if the manufacturer is otherwise liable for a time-of-
sale defect, like a design defect.  As a basis for punitive damages, 
the plaintiff may then argue that the defendant knew of the 
danger and failed to recall the product.104  That knowledge and 
 
102 Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga. 1997). 
103 Just as the lack of an agency recall order will not preclude punitive damages, 
violation of an affirmative recall order does not automatically trigger punitive 
damages. A violation of such an affirmative recall order renders compensatory 
damages available, but not punitive damages. This is treated the same as a violation 
of a safety standard, which does not make punitive damages automatically available. 
See supra text accompanying note 24. 
104 There is thus a distinction between actions that are the basis for 
compensatory versus punitive damages. 2 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 71, at 259 
(“[C]ourts usually do not focus on the appropriateness of attaching punitive damages 
to individual theories of recovery. When courts do address the separate underlying 
liability claims, the inquiry usually is whether the evidence was sufficient to 
establish the particular causes of action, and whether the defendant’s conduct was 
sufficiently egregious to support a punitive damages verdict, rather than whether 
punitive damages properly attach to a particular products liability cause of action.”). 
Typically, the defendant first improperly designed the product, which is what 
obligates the defendant to pay compensatory damages. Then, the defendant knew of 
that dangerous improper design, but did not recall the product. This failure to recall, 
however, is not what legally injured the plaintiff as it does not produce an injury 
compensable in tort. The failure to recall is thus not even tortious. Still, tort law 
allows punishment of that failure to recall. This distinction between types of conduct 
may present constitutional questions. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the 
Supreme Court mandated that a punitive damages award can punish the defendant 
only for how it injured the plaintiff. 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). If tort law does not 
recognize liability for injury due to the failure to recall, then how can tort law 
constitutionally punish the same conduct? Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
mandated that some “reasonable relationship” exist between the injury caused and 
the amount of punitive damages awarded. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 580–81 (1996). When a defendant fails to recall a product, though, no such 
reasonable relationship between injury and award exists, because the failure to 
recall did not cause any injury. 
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inaction could show that the defendant acted with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others, triggering the availability of 
punitive damages.  In fact, “[t]he failure of a manufacturer to 
remedy a known defect in an already marketed product has given 
rise to punitive damages in a good many products liability 
cases.”105  This is punishment for failing to recall the product—
even though an agency never ordered the product recall. 
Professor Owen cautioned:  “[P]unitive damages are 
appropriate in post-marketing cases only when the probable 
reduction in the risk of harm from such remedial measures 
clearly outweighs the manufacturer’s costs.”106  This is the same 
calculation that courts claim only government agencies can 
make; that is why courts defer to government agencies and do 
not award compensatory damages for a failure to recall unless a 
government agency ordered such a recall.  But apparently courts 
and juries are capable of this calculation when the question is 
whether to punish the defendant for its failure to recall. 
The lack of deference to government agencies with respect to 
the imposition of punitive damages hurts uniformity and 
predictability.  A manufacturer can be punished for not doing 
something it was not ordered to do, and the manufacturer has 
little chance of predicting the punishment ramifications of not 
recalling the product.  Currently, the manufacturer knows that it 
cannot be obligated to compensate a plaintiff injured by the 
failure to recall unless the government had ordered a recall.  But 
that predictability disappears in the tort law punishment 
context, which is the same context that the United States  
 
 
105 2 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 71, at 254. E.g., Reed v. Ford Motor Co., 679 
F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (alleging that defendant’s failure to voluntarily 
recall the product manifested its recklessness, rendering punitive damages 
available); Holmes v. Wegman Oil Co., 492 N.W.2d 107, 113 (S.D. 1992) (affirming a 
jury’s imposition of punitive damages on a manufacturer that “knew of the potential 
danger of explosion from the control knob for ten years prior to deciding to recall it”); 
see also Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) (reinstating a 
jury’s imposition of punitive damages where the manufacturer knew of its product’s 
tendency to cause fires but failed to inform “purchasers and prospective purchasers 
of the hazard”). Not surprisingly, the plaintiff’s attorney in the first trial against GM 
for the defective ignition switch mentioned to the jury GM’s alleged knowledge of the 
defect plus its thirteen-year delay in recalling the defective cars. See Ivory, supra 
note 1. 
106 2 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 71, at 256. 
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Supreme Court has already criticized as unpredictable.107  The 
lack of deference to agency action in the punishment context only 
worsens that unpredictability. 
C. The Illogic of Deference to Inaction 
Refusal to recognize tort liability for failure to recall because 
the agency never ordered a recall is deference to agency inaction.  
An agency’s not ordering a recall is not an affirmative decision; it 
is merely the lack of an order.  The lack of an order is not based 
on agency expertise, so there is no reason to defer to it.  
Similarly, it is inconsistent with negligence per se principles to 
allow an agency’s not ordering a recall to dictate that the 
manufacturer acted reasonably in not recalling the product.  And 
an untaken product recall is no different from any other untaken 
precaution that juries evaluate in every negligence claim.  In 
short, there is no reason to defer to agency inaction and refuse 
tort liability for failing to recall a product. 
1. Not Even Agency Action 
Multiple explanations exist for an agency’s not ordering a 
recall.  It is possible that the agency considered the 
circumstances and, after a full and thorough investigation, 
concluded that no recall was necessary.  Maybe the agency 
determined that no defect existed or that the danger presented 
was not severe enough to justify the costs of the recall.  Why this 
determination would be worthy of deference is unclear given that 
this type of determination receives no deference in a warning, in 
a design defect claim, or in a post-sale warning claim.108  
 
107 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008) (criticizing punitive 
damages for their unpredictability and explaining that a punitive damages award 
“should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad 
man’ can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one 
course of action or another”). 
108 Language describing agencies’ better ability to decide whether a defect 
justifies a recall just as easily applies to agencies’ better ability to decide whether a 
design or warning defect exists. In refusing to recognize liability for failure to recall, 
one North Carolina court explained that “expertise on interlock systems and design 
defects in minivans is more likely found in [the] NHTSA than in this [c]ourt.” Coker 
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 01 CVS 1264, 2004 WL 32676, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 5, 2004), aff’d, 617 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 627 S.E.2d 461 (N.C. 
2006). This should stop the court not only from resolving failure to recall claims, but 
also from resolving design defect claims. The court also explained that it “does not 
have the resources to scientifically determine the danger that the absence of an 
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Admittedly, however, such a determination is agency action and 
deference to it might make sense.109 
In most cases, a decision after a full investigation with 
complete information is not likely what happened.  Agencies are 
very dependent on receiving information from the 
manufacturer,110 which may only tell part of the story.  If, after 
an investigation, the agency concluded that no recall was 
necessary, such a conclusion was likely based only on incomplete 
information.111  A decision based on incomplete information does 
not deserve deference. 
Another real possibility for why an agency did not order a 
recall is because the agency never investigated the possible need 
for a recall.  Given the demand on agencies, this reason is not 
just possible, it is plausible.  Maybe the agency did not even 
know that the specific product caused a potential problem, or 
 
interlock system poses to consumers,” whereas the NHTSA does. Id. If this is true, 
no North Carolina court should hear any design or warning defect products claim, 
both of which will require the factfinder to determine the extent of danger of the 
product as is. 
109 This factual possibility makes the imposition of punitive damages for failure 
to recall even more remarkable. This informed decision to not order a recall shields 
the manufacturer from compensatory damages, possibly appropriately so. But tort 
law still allows the jury to punish the manufacturer for not recalling the product. 
110 See Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory 
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1489 (1994) (arguing 
that agencies rely on industries for information); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors 
Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1930 (2010) (mentioning that 
agencies are subject to “political influence” and “budgetary constraints” and are 
“dependen[t] on regulated entities for information”); Schwartz, Striking the Right 
Balance, supra note 37, at 445–46 (arguing that the FDA is dependent on the 
pharmaceutical industry for information); Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety 
Regulations, supra note 17, at 1147 (“Industry often controls indispensible [sic] data 
about the nature and extent of the safety problem that an agency is attempting to 
address, as well as information about the technology and costs of reducing or 
eliminating the risk.”). 
111 The NHTSA twice investigated GM’s defective ignition switch. In 2007, an 
NHTSA official proposed an official investigation into the failure of air bags to 
deploy in crashes involving Saturn Ions and Chevrolet Cobalts, but the NHTSA 
ultimately concluded that the evidence did not warrant a probe. Christopher Jensen, 
7 Years Before Recall, Crash Investigator Raised Concern over Switched-Off G.M. Air 
Bags, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/automobiles/7-
years-before-recall-crash-investigator-raised-concern-over-switched-off-gm-air-
bags.html. In 2010, NHTSA officials again considered a probe into the air bag 
deployment failures, but determined that “the data did not show a trend.” Gregory 
Wallace & Chris Isidore, Documents Show GM, Regulator Dropped Ball Before Fatal 
Crashes, CNN MONEY (Mar. 31, 2014, 12:25 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/30/autos/general-motors-recall-documents. 
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maybe the agency did not even know that the product existed.  
Regardless, the agency did not act.  An agency’s failure to order a 
recall is not the same as an order to not recall; it is not the same 
thing as a decision that a recall would not be reasonable.  Really, 
a failure to order a recall communicates nothing to the 
manufacturer regarding the reasonableness of a recall.  Yet, 
courts still defer to that inaction and refuse the possibility of tort 
liability. 
2. Inaction Is Not Based on Agency Expertise 
To the extent that courts cite any law in explaining why they 
cannot recognize liability for failure to recall, it is usually the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.112  Primary jurisdiction over a 
judicially cognizable claim applies where “enforcement of the 
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory 
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an 
administrative body.”113  The doctrine “is concerned with 
promoting proper relationships between the courts and 
administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory 
duties.”114  Usually, under primary jurisdiction, the court refers 
the issue to the agency and “stay[s] further proceedings so as to 
give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative 
ruling.”115 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction seemingly applies to 
recalls.  Product recalls “are properly the province of 
administrative agencies, as the federal statutes that expressly 
delegate recall authority to various agencies suggest.”116 
 
 
112 See, e.g., Clark v. Actavis Grp. HF, 567 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714–17 (D.N.J. 
2008); In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 432 (D.N.J. 
2007); Bussian v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 614, 627–28 (M.D.N.C. 
2006); Coker, 2004 WL 32676, at *4–5; Ford v. Toys R Us, Inc., No. W2005-01117-
COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 561865, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2006). 
113 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (citing Gen. Am. 
Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940)). 
114 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303 (1976) (quoting W. Pac. 
R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 63). 
115 Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993). 
116 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 901; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“Issues relating to product recalls 
are best evaluated by governmental agencies capable of gathering adequate data 
regarding the ramifications of such undertakings.”). 
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But primary jurisdiction is “a doctrine specifically applicable 
to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue 
within the special competence of an administrative agency.”117  If 
the agency never investigated a particular product, the agency 
never used its special competence to evaluate whether a recall is 
necessary.  In such a scenario, deference under primary 
jurisdiction makes little sense. 
Moreover, when the “agency did not consider the risk and did 
not apply its expertise, its silence should be meaningless in 
resolving the tort action.”118  This is the exact reason why courts 
refuse to defer to agency safety standards—the mere chance that 
the agency’s nonconsideration of risk Z is the reason why the 
agency did not include risk Z in the required warning.119  That 
mere chance is enough to refuse deference to the agency-
approved warning. 
The same chance exists within the failure to order a recall 
and it is likely more than mere.  At least with the warning, even 
though mention of risk Z was not required, it is known that the 
agency evaluated the product and its risks.  This is known 
because the agency did produce a required warning.  In the case 
of a not ordered recall, however, there is no evidence that the 
agency evaluated the product at all.  Thus, there is greater 
reason to suspect nonconsideration of the need for a recall than 
there is to suspect nonconsideration of risk Z within the warning. 
Surely some products escape agency attention.  Law 
professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell recently 
made waves in products liability jurisprudence by arguing for the 
elimination of products liability law.120  As part of their 
argument, Polinsky and Shavell explained how agency regulation 
already incentivizes the production of safe products, making any 
safety incentive created by products liability law less 
necessary.121  But even they realized that this incentive is 
strongest for mass-marketed products, meaning those products 
 
117 Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268. 
118 Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 17, at 1132; see also 
Morris, supra note 27 (“[W]hen the administrator has passed no judgment on the 
problem before the court, the administrative process can furnish no acceptable 
criteria of care.”). 
119 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
120 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for 
Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010). 
121 Id. at 1451–52. 
FINAL_LENS 10/12/2016  8:40 AM 
2016] PRODUCT RECALLS 361 
likely to actually be the subject of agency regulation.122  And 
thus, Polinsky and Shavell limited their proposed elimination of 
products liability law to only mass-marketed products.  But 
courts ignore the reality that some products escape agency 
attention in the context of an agency’s power to order a recall. 
Agency inaction on a product recall is agency inaction of 
“such indeterminate relevance that the courts would do well to 
exclude it in the absence of some indication that the 
administrator had considered the problem.”123  Current law, 
however, allows the agency’s inaction to dictate the outcome of 
the tort claim.  The agency’s not ordering a product recall—its 
inaction—precludes liability. 
Courts make no further effort to obtain and utilize agency 
expertise.  Usually, under primary jurisdiction, the court will 
stay the action and refer the issue to the agency.  With respect to 
product recalls, however, courts obviously do not stay the 
proceeding and ask the agency whether the manufacturer should 
have recalled the product five or ten or however many years 
ago.124  Instead, the court treats the agency’s not ordering of a 
recall as dictating that any such recall would have been 
unreasonable. 
3. Inconsistent with Negligence Per Se Principles 
Remember that the commentary to § 4 of the Third 
Restatement also states that “whether liability arises when there 
has been noncompliance or compliance with [product safety] 
 
122 Id. at 1476 (“[M]arket forces and regulation are likely to be less effective in 
promoting safety for products that are not widely sold than for products that are 
widely sold.”); see also Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products 
Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2457, 2502 (2013) (“[T]he vast majority of 
products liability cases—the portion of product space on which the law effectively 
operates—involve products that have the combination of observable utility, which 
attracts consumers, and hidden risk. . . . Government is too small and cannot 
possibly grow large enough to effectively regulate such a vast area of the market.”). 
123 Morris, supra note 27, at 161. 
124 Applied to a products liability claim: 
The primary jurisdiction doctrine . . . would require a court hearing a 
products liability claim concerning an FDA-approved product to stay the 
case and refer the parties to the FDA for a determination of certain issues, 
including whether the product is defective and whether a defect caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries. 
Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary 
Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2008). 
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statutes or regulations” addressing “such matters as post-sale 
warnings or recalls” is to be governed by negligence per se 
principles.125  Section 11’s narrow standards of liability, which 
preclude tort liability absent an agency order to recall, are far 
from consistent with negligence per se principles. 
Under negligence per se, the lack of an agency order could 
never define the relevant standard of conduct.  A regulation can 
only substitute as the standard of care if it was intended to 
protect people like the plaintiff and to prevent accidents like the 
one that happened to the plaintiff.126  Necessarily, the regulation 
must be an affirmative one; the lack of a regulation cannot 
substitute as the standard of care. 
This is exactly what happens, however, with an agency’s not 
ordering a recall.  If the agency never ordered a recall, it must 
have been reasonable for the defendant to not have undertaken 
one.  And the manufacturer cannot be liable in tort for failing to 
recall because no agency ever acted. 
This is equivalent to a defendant being able to conclusively 
demonstrate the lack of a defect, and thereby preclude tort 
liability, because no safety standard prohibited the design.  
Suppose the alleged defect is that the lawnmower engine should 
have stopped running sooner than ten seconds after the 
lawnmower is turned off.  But no agency regulation requires that 
it be designed in such a way.  The agency had the opportunity to 
evaluate such a regulation, but did not adopt one.  There is no 
applicable safety standard; technically, the defendant complied 
with the absence of safety standard.  If the court treated the lack 
of a safety standard as it treats the lack of a recall order, the 
court would find no defect as a matter of law. 
 
 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). As noted, this comment clearly also refers to regulations that may govern 
product recalls. Compliance and noncompliance with agency recall orders, however, 
is not governed by negligence per se rules; it is governed by § 11 of the Third 
Restatement. See supra Section II.A. 
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (listing the 
requirements for when a “legislative enactment or an administrative regulation” can 
be adopted as the standard of care); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. 
& EMOT. HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that an actor is negligent if he 
violates “a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s 
conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is 
designed to protect”). 
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It is not even possible to come up with a hypothetical 
application in the more general negligence per se context.  
Suppose the defendant is texting while driving.  The legislature 
or local authority had the ability to prohibit texting while 
driving, but it did not do so.  Maybe the legislature decided to not 
prohibit it, or maybe the legislature never even considered the 
possibility of criminalization.  Regardless, the defendant 
technically complied with the lack of a law prohibiting texting.  If 
the court treated the lack of a prohibition in the same way it 
treats the lack of a recall order, the defendant could establish 
reasonable conduct as a matter of law.  But under negligence per 
se principles, the lack of a prohibition on texting while driving 
means that it is legal.  And simply complying with the lack of a 
prohibition—that is, acting legally—does not establish 
reasonable conduct because a reasonable person may have 
exercised more care and not texted while driving. 
It is difficult to even write these hypotheticals because they 
are nonsensical.  But this is the current law on product recalls.  If 
the agency never ordered a recall, and the manufacturer never 
did one, the manufacturer acted reasonably as a matter of law 
and cannot be liable in tort.  All of this is inconsistent with 
negligence per se. 
4. There Is Nothing Special About Product Recalls 
Courts’ extreme deference to agency action on recalls is 
based on the perceived superiority of agencies to evaluate the 
need for recalls, and agency proceedings may be a better forum 
for investigating the extreme costs of a recall.127  Juries, however, 
 
127 But see note 110 and accompanying text (discussing agencies’ dependence on 
industries for information). Regardless, this sentiment is partly based on perceived 
institutional limitations. “Courts deal with the business of individual cases grounded 
on specific facts.” Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1315 (Kan. 
1993). The agency may be better equipped to investigate whether the product is 
endangering the public, as opposed to the court, which has only one injured plaintiff 
in front of it. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 901. True, in litigation for failure to recall, 
the plaintiff would present evidence of injuries other than just his or her own—just 
as a plaintiff does when trying to demonstrate that a product is defectively designed 
or has an inadequate warning. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 543 
S.E.2d 21, 23–25 (Ga. 2001); Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 514 S.E.2d 227, 230–31 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1999); Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 612–16 (Iowa 2000); 
Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 983–86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005), aff’d, 922 A.2d 890 (Pa. 2007); Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 609 S.E.2d 286, 
300 (S.C. 2005); Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. 
2004). If the introduction of this evidence is not problematic for design and warning 
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consider the costs of an untaken precaution in every negligence 
claim.128  Juries also evaluate costs related to products in almost 
every design defect claim.129  Plus, juries will consider the costs of 
a post-sale warning in determining whether the defendant’s 
failure to issue a post-sale warning was unreasonable.  No one 
doubts that the costs of a post-sale warning can be extensive, 
which is why some courts have hesitated or refused to adopt this 
type of liability.130  There is also little doubt that agency 
proceedings would be a superior forum to investigate and 
evaluate those costs.  But a majority of courts still trust juries to 
evaluate those costs.131 
Admittedly, the costs of a recall are extensive,132 but tort law 
has never before imposed some sort of limitation on a jury’s 
 
defect claims, courts should not have a problem with it for failure to recall claims 
either. Additionally, there may be some hesitance because of the perceived breadth 
of a liability finding for failure to warn—that is, that the manufacturer should have 
recalled the entire product line—even though only one injured plaintiff is before the 
court. Again, this same effect occurs in design and warning defect claims. If that 
breadth—that all products so designed or with the same warning are defective—is 
not problematic for those claims, it should not be problematic for a failure to recall 
claim. Obviously, liability for design or warning defect does not require the 
manufacturer to alter the design or warning, just as liability for failure to recall 
would not require the manufacturer to undertake a recall. 
128 Hylton, supra note 122, at 2505 (“Negligence law has long required plaintiffs 
to bring forth a specific untaken precaution as evidence of negligence.”). The 
question of whether the failure to undertake that precaution was reasonable then 
focuses on the costs and benefits of that untaken precaution, and how the burden—
the cost—of undertaking that precaution weighs against the likely injury to result 
from the failure to undertake that precaution. Judge Learned Hand famously first 
introduced this analytic framework in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In a claim based on a failure to recall, the jury would simply 
compare the likely injuries to result without the recall and the costs of the recall. 
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (defining a design 
defect as existing when “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe”). 
130 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
132 The costs of the recall will overlap with the costs of the post-sale warning. 
The costs of a product recall include the costs to notify product users and then also to 
remedy the defect. In a challenge to an NHTSA recall order decades ago, Ford 
asserted that the cost of merely giving notice of the defect to all present owners 
would exceed $500,000 and the replacement of the seat pins would cost the company 
approximately $31 per car or $19 million in total. Ford Motor Co. v. Coleman, 402 F. 
Supp. 475, 494 (D.D.C. 1975) (Hart, J., dissenting), aff’d, 425 U.S. 927 (1976). The 
costs related to fixing the actual product, however, assume that product users will 
take advantage of the remedy. General thought is that recalls have a very low 
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ability to evaluate unreasonable conduct because the costs of an 
untaken precaution exceed some undefined ceiling.  This would 
be equivalent to a court finding reasonable conduct as a matter of 
law because of the extensive costs of the untaken precaution 
without first evaluating the costs of the injuries that would result 
without that precaution.  Courts rarely ever decide breach of a 
duty of care as a matter of law,133 and certainly could not do so 
without first evaluating the costs of the injuries. 
Additionally, if product recalls are so special, why do courts 
allow juries to punish the untaken recall?  If product recalls are 
so complicated and costly, such that juries cannot impose liability 
for failing to take one, juries should similarly not be trusted to 
consider that exact same untaken, complicated, and costly recall 





response rate. The rate improves if the product being recalled is a children’s product 
or a car. Even then, the rate is low. According to one study, less than four percent of 
children’s products in consumer hands are fixed. JORDAN DURRETT, KIDS IN 
DANGER, A DECADE OF DATA: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT 2014 AND A TEN-YEAR 
RETROSPECTIVE ON CHILDREN’S PRODUCT RECALLS 17–18 (2015), 
http://www.kidsindanger.org/docs/research/2015_KID_Recall_Report.pdf. This report 
was referenced by USA Today in a February 2014 article. Alicia McElhaney, Only 
10% of Recalled Kids Products Fixed or Returned, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2014, 7:32 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/02/18/child-safety-
recall-effectiveness-report/5425555. A study of car recalls from 2000 through 2008 
revealed that 55% to 75% of all passenger vehicles with safety defect recalls are 
fixed. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-603, AUTO SAFETY: NHTSA HAS 
OPTIONS TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY DEFECT RECALL PROCESS 24–25 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319698.pdf. Some years, however, had a response rate 
as low as 23% to 53%. Id. at 25. 
133 The Third Restatement explains the jury’s role in deciding breach: 
The longstanding American practice has been to treat the negligence 
question as one that is assigned to the jury; to this extent, the question is 
treated as one that is equivalent to a question of fact. Accordingly, so long 
as reasonable minds can differ in evaluating whether the actor’s conduct 
lacks reasonable care, the responsibility for making this evaluation rests 
with the jury. To be sure, in some cases reasonable minds can reach only 
one conclusion. Accordingly, the rule recognized in this Section permits a 
directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law—that the actor’s conduct 
must be found negligent, or free of negligence. Yet most of the time, the 
rule set forth in this Section calls for a jury decision on the negligence 
issue. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2010). 
FINAL_LENS 10/12/2016  8:40 AM 
366 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:329   
Complete deference to agency inaction on product recalls 
creates “uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business 
entrusted to a particular agency.”134  Uniformity cannot be too 
important, however, if courts refuse to defer to agency safety 
standards and post-sale warning requirements.135  Regardless, 
what type of uniformity is achieved by deferring to inaction?  A 
uniform lack of product recalls?  That same uniformity would 
exist even if a court found liability for failure to recall, which 
would obligate the manufacturer only to pay the injured 
plaintiff’s damages, not to undertake an actual recall.  It is 
simply false that “courts that impose a post-sale obligation to 
remedy or replace products already in the marketplace arrogate 
to themselves a power equivalent to that of requiring product 
recall.”136  A court cannot order a design change nor can it order a 
recall.137  Thus, uniformity in the lack of recalls would still exist.  
Similarly, uniformity in who has the authority to order a recall—
agencies only—would still exist. 
It is somewhat understandable that courts may feel 
uncomfortable deciding whether the manufacturer should have 
recalled a product, and instead believing that an agency should 
decide.  That same discomfort should exist, however, every time 
the jury considers an expensive untaken precaution.  If taken 
seriously, that discomfort would cause a rewrite of much of 
negligence law, something that is not likely to happen.  There is  
 
 
134 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303–04 (1976); see also 
Commander Props. Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 745 F. Supp. 650, 652 (D. Kan. 
1990) (deferring determination of whether a product was defective to agency partly 
because “the interests of uniformity and consistency in the aviation field would be 
promoted by the FAA’s resolution of these issues”). 
135 See supra Part I. 
136 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 901. 
137 Again, the remedy for failure to recall is payment of the plaintiff’s damages 
that result from that failure to recall, as opposed to a court ordering a recall. 
Admittedly, injunctive relief forcing a recall would create administrative problems. 
Unlike an agency, a court does not “have in place a system to order a nationwide 
recall.” Coker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 01 CVS 1264, 2004 WL 32676, at *1, *5 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2004), aff’d, 617 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 627 
S.E.2d 461 (N.C. 2006). Plus, a nationwide recall would likely be inappropriate if 
ordered in a state court case, as states have different definitions of defectiveness; a 
product defective in North Carolina could easily not be defective under South 
Carolina law. But an actual recall can only be ordered as a part of injunctive relief, 
and general limits on equitable relief, namely, the adequacy of the plaintiff’s 
damages, make it unlikely that a court would grant such an injunction. 
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no reason for any discomfort to preclude courts from imposing 
liability for a manufacturer’s failure to undertake a product 
recall. 
CONCLUSION 
Products liability law should be suffering from a cognitive 
dissonance.  The law allows violations of agency standards and 
regulations to define defect and unreasonable conduct with 
respect to post-sale warnings.  But compliance with the same 
does not define a lack of a defect nor does it define reasonable 
conduct with respect to post-sale warnings.  And neither 
violations of nor compliance with agency regulations defines 
whether punishment is appropriate.  But agency orders on 
product recalls do define reasonable conduct.  In fact, an agency’s 
not ordering a recall defines that the manufacturer acted 
reasonably in not recalling the product and precludes tort 
liability.  However, those same orders lack that effect when the 
question is whether to punish.  Rather, the manufacturer can be 
punished for not recalling even though no agency order required 
it to do so. 
The inconsistencies are troubling.  But what is more 
troubling is the very idea that inaction currently precludes tort 
liability, especially given the high likelihood that products escape 
the agency’s attention.  Returning to GM’s ignition switches, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration did actually 
have notice of a potential problem with GM’s vehicles.  It twice 
investigated the nondeployment of air bags in crashes in certain 
GM vehicles, but neither investigation proceeded past the 
preliminary stage.138  And for that reason, GM cannot face 
liability for its failure to recall.  As the law currently stands, the 
agency’s failure to order a recall immunizes the manufacturer’s 
failure to recall. 
 
138 See supra note 111 (describing the NHTSA’s actions). 
